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 Chapter 7 
 Aristotle on Enduring Evils While Staying Happy 
 Marta  Jimenez 
 7.1  Virtue, Happiness, and What is Evil for Humans 
 In what ways and how far does virtue shield someone against suff ering 
evils? In other words, how do non- moral evils aff ect the lives of virtuous 
people and to what extent can someone endure evils while staying happy? 
Th e central purpose of this chapter is to answer these questions by explor-
ing what Aristotle has to say about the eff ects of evils in human well- being 
in general and his treatment of extreme misfortunes. 
 In Aristotle’s ethical treatises, the term  kakon (bad, evil) is used in a 
broad sense. It generally applies to things that destroy or hinder happiness 
( eudaimonia ), tarnish the joy of the blessed ( makarioi ), or contribute to 
making someone miserable ( athlios ). 1  Evils are often referred to as “objects 
of avoidance” ( ta pheukta ), 2  which Aristotle classifi es into the shameful ( to 
aischron ), the harmful ( to blaberon ), and the painful ( to lupêron ) ( NE II 3 
1104 b 30– 32 ), and which have diff erent kinds of impact on our well- being. 
Among evils we fi nd evils “of the soul” ( peri psuchên ) and, in contrast, 
evils that are non- moral and mostly due to bad luck ( atuchia ). Th e fi rst 
group includes what are often called “ moral evils ,” evils that encompass 
all the failures concerning dispositions of character, including mainly vice 
( kakia ), weakness of will ( akrasia ), and brutishness ( thêriotês ) ( NE VII 1 
1145 a 16 – 17 ). Th e second group, which I shall call “ evils of fortune ,” comprise 
both bodily evils (such as sickness, weakness, or ugliness) and external evils 
(such as poverty, lack of friends, or premature death). 
  1   Th e term most frequently used by Aristotle to mark the opposite of happiness is  athlios . He uses the 
term  kakodaimonia (unhappiness) only three times (at  Poetics ,  Protrepticus , and the  Fragments ) and 
never confers to it a central role. (See  Mulhern  2008 for a study of the term  kakia and the related 
 kak - expressions.) 
 2   See e.g.,  NE III 12 1119 a 23 , VII 1 1145 a 16 , VII 4 1148 b 4 , VII 13 1153 b 2 , X 2 1172 b 19 , 1173 a 10 , X 5 1175 b 25 , 
and  EE VII 2 1236 b 37 . About the coextension of evils and objects of avoidance, see e.g.,  NE X 2 
1173 a 10: “For if both belong to the class of evils ( kakôn ), then they ought both to be objects of aver-
sion ( pheukta ).” Unless otherwise noted, all quotations from Aristotle’s works are from Barnes 1984, 
with some modifi cations. 
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 Th e main diff erence between these two sorts of evils is that while fail-
ures of character (evils of the soul) are always bad – i.e., always obstacles 
to  eudaimonia  – and have the power of making bad everything else, even 
things which are “generally” ( haplôs ) or “by nature” ( phusei ) good, the evils 
of fortune are not always bad  – instead, their badness depends on the 
agent’s condition. Concretely, many evils of fortune are often not bad for 
those who have a good character, and sometimes enduring those evils well 
can even provide some benefi t and indirectly contribute to a good person’s 
fl ourishing. Th ere are, however, limits to the capacity of a good person to 
deal with evils gracefully, so that numerous or extreme misfortunes will 
negatively aff ect the lives of those who suff er them, including good people. 
 In  Section 7.2 I explore the reasons behind the asymmetric eff ects that 
fortune has on good and bad people. Aristotle fully embraces the Socratic 
“ conditionality thesis ” that virtue is necessary to make other good things 
good; 3  in other words, non- moral goods depend for their value on the 
presence of virtue. Consequently, those who have defective characters will 
see non- moral goods, and specifi cally goods of fortune, turn bad in their 
hands. Evils of the soul, then, are not only intrinsically bad on account 
of directly contributing to the agent’s misery – they are also indirectly or 
instrumentally harmful insofar as they make everything else bad. 
 Th e main reason for this is that, without virtue, an agent will often inap-
propriately use the goods of fortune and tend to enjoy them in ways that 
impede the development of good qualities of character and reinforce bad 
ones. A crucial failure of non- virtuous people is – as I show in  Section 7.3 
– that they do not properly grasp the hierarchy and relations of depend-
ency between diff erent kinds of goods and evils, and in particular, the 
relations between the shameful, the harmful, and the painful. As a result, 
non- virtuous individuals fail to guide their actions and choices according 
to an adequate assessment of the weight that diff erent kinds of goods and 
evils of fortune should have in our lives, and thus they often promote 
their own misery. In contrast, virtuous people are not only most able to 
make adequate use of goods of fortune but also can endure misfortunes 
while staying happy precisely because they have an adequate sense of the 
hierarchy and relations between the diff erent kinds of objects of choice 
and avoidance. 
 In  Section 7.4 I investigate how non- moral evils aff ect the lives of virtu-
ous people by looking at Aristotle’s ambivalent relation to Socrates’ famous 
 3   In many passages, Socrates argues that only the virtuous person can be benefi ted by natural goods 
such as health, wealth, power, etc. See e.g.,  Apology 28b2– 4,  Meno 87c– 89a,  Euthydemus 278e– 282a. 
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thesis that virtue is suffi  cient for happiness (i.e., Socrates’ “ suffi  ciency the-
sis ”). Aristotle’s precise position on this issue is notoriously diffi  cult to pin 
down, as is familiar from the much- debated question concerning his view 
on the role of goods of fortune in human well- being. Just as with goods of 
fortune, Aristotle often seems ambivalent about whether evils of fortune 
can directly aff ect the lives of good people. I argue that, although gener-
ally optimistic, he ultimately concedes that evils of fortune can have both 
indirect and direct eff ects on anyone’s well- being and thus can have a direct 
negative impact also on the happiness of a good person. 
 In  Sections 7.5 and  7.6 I further explore the potential eff ects of evils 
of fortune in the lives of virtuous people and clarify why Aristotle has 
mixed feelings in relation to the suffi  ciency thesis. Aristotle partly agrees 
with Socrates on this issue, but maintains some crucial points of disagree-
ment. On the one hand, as I show in  Section 7.5 , Aristotle holds that in 
most cases virtuous people can endure gracefully the obstacles presented 
by external evils and take them as opportunities to exercise their virtues 
and thus promote their own well- being. Th is view harmonizes with the 
suffi  ciency thesis. 
 On the other hand, as I show in  Section 7.6 , Aristotle admits that 
some evils unavoidably damage or tarnish the happiness of those who 
suff er them, even if the agents are virtuous people and otherwise have 
enjoyed a decent life. Th is view sits in tension with the suffi  ciency thesis 
and is due to the peculiar character of the relationship between agency 
and happiness in Aristotle’s account. As I argue, the general criterion 
that determines the potentially damaging eff ect of evils of fortune in the 
lives of virtuous agents is whether they leave room for noble activity – 
i.e. whether the agents can compensate the pains and losses suff ered by 
achieving instead the noble. Th ose cases where virtuous agents endure 
pains or losses while doing noble actions will contribute to their happi-
ness. In contrast, cases where the pains and losses are so intense that they 
cannot be easily compensated by the nobility of the actions, or where 
the agent does not have full agency and consequently does not have the 
opportunity to act virtuously given the circumstances, will unavoidably 
tarnish the agents’ happiness. 
 7.2  Moral Evils Spoil Goods of Fortune: Th e Flipside of the 
Conditionality Th esis 
 From the fi rst chapters of the  Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle shows his 
doubts about the possibility of talking about goods and evils in a clean- cut 
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way. In relation to goods, Aristotle claims that “fi ne and just actions” ( ta 
de kala kai ta dikaia ) “exhibit much variety and fl uctuation,” and that 
“goods” ( t’agatha ) also exhibit a similar fl uctuation “because they bring 
harm ( blabas ) to the many” ( NE I 3 1194 b 14– 18). Th e many, who have no 
virtue, do not have the ability to reliably make proper use of good things, 
so that often things that are naturally good turn out to be harmful for 
them. For example, he adds, for many people wealth and political power 
are harmful, and even traits that are generally taken to be unconditionally 
good, like courage, can be harmful when possessed by someone who is not 
truly virtuous ( NE I 3 1194 b 18– 19). 
 At least part of the reason for this fl uctuation of the good is that the psy-
chological traits of agents, which comprise their character, aff ect the good-
ness or badness of things. Aristotle, like Socrates, holds the “conditionality 
thesis,” i.e., that virtue is the only unconditional good and the condition 
of goodness for everything else. Although people consider some things to 
be “simply” or “absolutely” ( haplôs ) good, including the so- called mate-
rial, external, or competitive goods (such as wealth, honors, and pleasure), 
these things are not in fact good for everybody. Th eir goodness depends on 
the (moral) psychic conditions in which agents fi nd themselves, and they 
are reliably good only for the good person. 
 At  NE I 8 1098 b 12– 16, Aristotle presents a classic and apparently straight-
forward classifi cation of goods into “external” ( ektos ) goods, goods of the 
body ( peri sôma ) and goods “of the soul” ( peri psuchên ). But things are 
more complex than this classifi cation suggests, since between these kinds 
of goods and between the corresponding evils there is a hierarchy and sev-
eral dependency relations. For example, certain external goods like wealth 
or political power are good only for those who have virtue (the main good 
of the soul) and may be harmful for non- virtuous individuals; similarly, 
certain external goods like abundant food are good only for those who 
have health, and so on. In general, the goods of the soul are “the most 
properly and truly goods” (1198 b 14– 15), and possessing goods of the soul 
(and concretely, virtue) has priority over the other goods. Even health, 
which is the most basic good of the body, is guaranteed to be good only 
for the good person. 
 Th ese relations of dependency also apply to the diff erent sorts of 
evils. Th is point is clear in the case of good or bad bodily conditions, 
since these often determine the ways in which agents are aff ected by 
external goods and evils. For example, health and strength can ena-
ble people to thrive even in hostile environments, while sickness and 
weakness often impede thriving even in favorable situations. Similarly, 
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conditions of the soul determine the degree to which agents can enjoy 
the rest of goods or be negatively aff ected by evils. Virtue typically shields 
people against all kinds of evils, while vice is often an obstacle to gain-
ing benefi ts from any goods. In general, evils of the soul (bad character 
traits) are the clearest obstacles to virtue and, consequently, to the good 
life; for this reason, they are potentially much more harmful than evils 
of the body and external evils, and they should always be avoided fi rst. 
 As we learn in  NE VII 1, the three big categories of failures of charac-
ter – vice ( kakia ), incontinence ( akrasia ), and brutishness ( thêriotês ) – are 
among the “things to be avoided” ( pheuktôn ) (1145 a 16 – 17 ), and this not 
only because they are bad in themselves, but also because they cause things 
that are naturally good to turn evil for the agents. Failures of character, 
then, are both intrinsically and instrumentally bad. 
 7.2.1  Th e Intrinsic Badness of Moral Evils 
 Moral evils are  intrinsically bad in that they directly contribute to the 
agent’s misery by producing internal confl ict, self- hatred, and psychologi-
cal pain, especially regret ( metameleia ). 4  At  NE IX 4 1166 b 6– 25 , Aristotle 
claims that people with bad character “are at odds with themselves” ( dia-
pherontai gar heautois ) and for this reason can even be self- destructive:
 Th ese [attributes of self- love] hardly belong even to bad people ( phauloi ); 
for they are at odds with themselves, and have appetites for some things and 
wishes for others. Th is is true, for instance, of incontinent people ( akrateis ); 
for they choose, instead of the things they think good for themselves ( heau-
tois agathôn ), things that are pleasant but harmful; while others again, 
through cowardice and laziness, shrink from doing what they think best 
for themselves ( beltista heautois ). And those who have done many terrible 
deeds and are hated for their wickedness even shrink from life and destroy 
themselves ( anairousin heautous ).  ( NE IX 4 1166 b 6– 13 ) 
 Bad people are internally divided and frequently suff er psychological strug-
gles. Th eir souls, Aristotle explains, are “in a state of faction” ( stasiazei ) 
(1166 b 19 ), where diff erent parts pull in diff erent directions. Concretely, what 
they aim at with their non- rational appetites is diff erent and often in con-
fl ict with what they rationally desire or wish. As a consequence, they are 
often pained about the fact that in the past they were pleased by something 
bad and now are full of regrets (1166 b 24– 25 ). For this reason, Aristotle adds, 
 4   See Grönroos 2015 for a recent discussion of why Aristotle’s vicious person is miserable, and Muller 
2015 for a detailed defense of the claim that for Aristotle the vicious person is internally confl icted. 
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the bad person is not a friend of himself or lovable in any way. Given these 
internal divisions and tensions, the bad person “is highly miserable” ( lian 
estin athlion ). In sum, bad character makes people self- loathing, friendless, 
and miserable, and therefore,  “we should strain every nerve to avoid bad-
ness” ( pheukteon tên mochthêrian diatetamenôs ) ( NE IX 4 1166 b 25– 29 ). 
 7.2.2  Th e Instrumental Badness of Moral Evils 
 In addition to being bad in themselves, moral evils are also  instrumentally 
bad , since they make things that are generally good turn out to be bad for 
the agent. Th is is the fl ip side of the conditionality thesis: failures of char-
acter have the power of converting things that are naturally good or neutral 
into harms, given that bad people typically make bad use of the goods 
of fortune.  Eudemian Ethics VIII 3 is the  locus classicus for this view that 
the so- called goods of fortune, which Aristotle here calls “natural goods” 
( ta phusei agatha ), are not good for everyone:
 A good person, then, is one for whom the natural goods are good . For the 
goods people fi ght for and think the greatest  – honour, wealth, bodily 
excellences, good fortune, and power  – are naturally good ( agatha men 
phusei ), but may be harmful ( blabera ) for some people ( tisi ) because of 
their dispositions ( dia tas hexeis ). For neither the foolish ( aphrôn ) nor the 
unjust ( adikon ) nor the intemperate ( akolastos ) would get any good from 
the employment of them, any more than a sick person ( kamnôn ) from the 
food of a healthy person, and a weak or disabled person ( ho asthenês kai 
anapêros ) from the equipment of someone healthy and sound in all limbs. 
 ( EE VIII 3 1248 b 26– 34 ) 
 Th e foolish, the unjust, and the intemperate – in general, bad people – do 
not make good use of external goods, and therefore things that are natu-
rally good, or generally good, are often harmful for those with the wrong 
dispositions of character or intellect. Whether something is good or bad 
for someone, then, depends on the moral, intellectual, or physical condi-
tion of that person. 5  Abundant food is not good for the glutton, abundant 
wealth is not good for the prodigal person, abundant confi dence is not 
good for those without practical insight, and so on. On the contrary, those 
things are typically harmful for these people. Similarly, sick people take no 
benefi t from the kind of nutrition that is benefi cial for a healthy person, 
 5   Th e inclusion of the foolish person ( aphrôn ) in this passage indicates that the relevant failures on the 
side of the agent are not just failures of character but also intellectual – in particular, lack of  phronê-
sis . For a detailed discussion of the non- virtuous intellectual states and of the vice of  aphrosunê , see 
 Kontos  2014 . 
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and the tools or equipment of healthy and strong individuals might be of 
no use to those who are weak or disabled. 
 7.2.3  Goods Absolutely ( haplôs ) v. Goods for Someone ( tini ) 
 Th e relevant distinction here is between what is “ naturally ” ( phusei ) or “ abso-
lutely ” ( haplôs ) good or bad, and what is good or bad  for an individual ( tini ) 
or for some people ( tisi ). Th e good person is the only one for whom the 
external goods, which are absolutely good, are also reliably good and ben-
efi cial; for the others, it is not always true that what is  naturally good is also 
good  for them . Th is point is made explicit in  NE V 1, where Aristotle explains 
the relationship of the unjust person to the goods and evils of fortune:
 Since the unjust person is grasping, he must be concerned with goods – not 
all goods, but those with which prosperity ( eutuchia ) and adversity ( atuchia ) 
have to do, which taken absolutely ( haplôs ) are always good, but for a par-
ticular person ( tini ) are not always good. (People pray for and pursue the 
same things; but they should not, but should pray that the things that are 
good absolutely may also be good  for them ( autois ), and should choose the 
things that are good for them.) Th e unjust person does not always choose 
the greater, but also the less – in the case of things bad absolutely ( haplôs 
kakôn ); but because the lesser evil is itself thought to be in a sense good, and 
graspingness is directed at the good, therefore he is thought to be grasping. 
 ( NE V 1 1129 b 1– 10 ) 
 Unjust people, who fail to properly apply this distinction between  goods in 
absolute terms and  goods for someone in particular will pursue the so- called 
goods of fortune in absolute terms and will try to avoid the correspond-
ing evils, even though doing so will not always be good for them or for 
people with bad character in general. On the contrary, because of their bad 
character, unjust people will pursue and use the goods of fortune in ways 
that reinforce their defective dispositions, and consequently, these goods 
will turn out to be bad for them insofar as they will further their vice and 
thereby increase their misery. 
 In contrast, just people (and virtuous people in general) are able to 
properly enjoy natural goods, since in their case what is good absolutely 
is also good  for them. While these two senses of “good” come apart for 
many people, virtue makes them “be in harmony” ( sumphônêsai ) with one 
another ( EE VII 2 1236 b 32– 1237 b 3 ). Th is is, as Aristotle claims in our pas-
sage from  NE V 1 above, the kind of harmony that we all should pray 
for, since otherwise we may be shooting in the dark and trying to acquire 
things that are not really good for us. 
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 7.3  Choosing Well Between the Shameful, the 
Harmful, and the Painful 
 In what sense are the goods  haplôs also good  for the virtuous agent? In 
other words, how does virtue equip people with the capacity to benefi t 
from natural goods? And what enables virtuous people to be right about 
good and evil? Aristotle’s view is that virtuous people are the only ones who 
properly understand the hierarchy and relations of dependency between 
the diff erent kinds of goods and evils mentioned above, and thus are the 
only ones able to correctly grasp the place of goods and evils of fortune in 
their lives. Moreover, good people tend to be right and have a clear view 
of the complex relation between the diff erent objects of choice and avoid-
ance. In  NE II 3, Aristotle provides a distinction between three objects of 
“choice” ( hairesis ) and three of “avoidance” ( phugê ) that is crucial to estab-
lishing what the virtuous person gets right:
 Th ere are three objects of choice and three of avoidance, the noble, the 
advantageous, and the pleasant ( kalou sumpherontos hêdeos ), and their 
contraries, the shameful, the harmful, and the painful ( aischrou blaberou 
lupêrou ). About all of these the good person tends to go right and the bad 
person to err, and especially about pleasure; for this is common to the ani-
mals, and also it accompanies all objects of choice; for even the noble and 
the advantageous appear pleasant.  ( NE II 3 1104 b 30– 1105 a 1 ) 
 In this framework, the main diff erence between virtuous and non- virtu-
ous people is that virtuous people can properly sort out the relationships 
between these three categories of value and appreciate a certain harmony 
between them. Non- virtuous people, in contrast, often perceive confl ict 
between these values and tend to misjudge their relative worth. Only virtu-
ous people properly grasp, then, the hierarchical relationships between the 
noble, the advantageous, and the pleasant, as well as between the shame-
ful, the harmful and the painful, and only they are able to organize their 
preferences accordingly. 
 Th is ability to understand and properly apply in practice the hierarchy 
of objects of choice and avoidance is at least part of what Aristotle is refer-
ring to in  NE III 4, where he explains how the good person has a diff erent 
conception and perception of the good – and we might add, of evil – than 
the rest, and asserts that only the good person sees the truth in relation to 
the noble and the pleasant:
 Each state of character has its own set of things that are noble and pleasant, 
and perhaps the good person diff ers from others most by seeing the truth in 
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each class of things, being as it were the norm and measure of them. In most 
things the error seems to be due to pleasure; for it appears a good when it is 
not. We therefore choose the pleasant as a good, and avoid pain as an evil. 
 ( NE III 4 1113 a 31- b 2) 
 Th e core of virtuous people’s practical knowledge and what makes them 
reliably good users of natural goods is that they are aware of the relative 
value of the diff erent kinds of goods and evils – e.g., that the goods of the 
soul are always preferable over the goods of the body or external goods, 
that enduring the painful or even the harmful is in general preferable to 
doing something shameful, and so on. Moreover, virtuous people are able 
to experience the characteristic pleasures and benefi ts of nobility in ways 
that both compensate for the occasional pains and losses required by virtu-
ous action and counterbalance the eff ects of misfortunes. As we will see in 
 Section 7.4 , this ability is the main reason why virtuous people are better 
prepared to endure many evils of fortune. 
 In contrast, those with a defective character tend to get things wrong 
regarding the relationship between the three main objects of choice and 
the three main objects of avoidance, since they are unable to correctly 
assess what is truly benefi cial and what is harmful for them, and since they 
have a strong preference for pleasure (or avoiding pain) and gain (or avoid-
ing loss) over the noble (or avoiding the shameful). As a consequence, they 
often choose things that are bad for them in two senses: their choices con-
tribute to increasing the internal struggles in their souls, since they focus 
on their own (often confl icting) appreciation of the pleasures or benefi ts 
that result from their actions; and insofar as they fail to pay suffi  cient 
attention to the nobility or shamefulness of their actions, their choices fail 
to promote their own virtuous activity and tend instead to reinforce their 
character failures. 
 7.4  Evils of Fortune and Virtue: Th e Limits of the 
Suffi  ciency Th esis 
 While it is well known that Aristotle considers the goods of fortune as 
important for a good life, the role of evils of fortune is less familiar. Are 
these evils obstacles to virtue and our well-being? To what extent can their 
presence ruin the good person’s happiness? In the debate about the role of 
external goods in human well- being we fi nd two main camps: the defend-
ers of the  instrumental character of the goods of fortune for virtue, and 
consequently for happiness, who attribute to Aristotle the suffi  ciency the-
sis; and the defenders of the claim that the goods of fortune are, together 
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with virtue,  constitutive elements of happiness, who hold that virtue is not 
suffi  cient for happiness, since external goods are independently needed 
for the good life. 6  What the discussion of the evils of fortune adds is a 
confi rmation that Aristotle has mixed feelings in relation to the suffi  ciency 
thesis; while he mostly embraces it, he also acknowledges some clear excep-
tions to it. 
 Aristotle holds that virtue not only enables using the goods of fortune 
to promote one’s  eudaimonia , but also has the power to mitigate the 
harms of the evils of fortune; in fact, it can even transform evils into 
goods by taking them as opportunities to exercise the agent’s goodness. 
It is a sign of good character to be able to deal well with evils of fortune 
– i.e., the good person will handle misfortunes gracefully and sometimes 
even in ways that enhance their virtue and their experience of life. Th e 
virtuous and happy person, the person able to build a good life and to 
provide it with stability, is capable of handling everyday misfortunes and 
of harmonizing them within a happy existence. However, evils of fortune 
can sometimes present serious obstacles to the good life, even for virtu-
ous people. 
 Of course, the size, number, and intensity of the misfortunes is rel-
evant to assess their potential positive or negative eff ect on a person’s life. 
Th roughout the ethical treatises Aristotle off ers several lists of what here I 
call “evils of fortune,” which typically include evils of the body and exter-
nal evils of all sizes, degrees of intensity, and degrees of infl uence on our 
lives. Th e evils of fortune encompass both small- scale or ordinary evils 
(such as sickness, weakness, disability, poverty, and ugliness) and large- 
scale misfortunes (such as those of Priam, the prosperous king of Troy 
whose kingdom and family were destroyed when he was an old man). 
 While the good person will be able to handle small- scale misfortunes 
with ease, either as good challenges or as manageable inconveniences, she 
will not so easily be able to withstand large- scale misfortunes. In cases 
where the evils are many or of grand proportions, Aristotle agrees that 
they unavoidably aff ect the lives of any agent in a negative way, including 
the lives of good people. Th is, he thinks, is undeniable, unless one is stub-
bornly committed to a thesis:
 6   Th e most prominent defender of the view that external goods are instrumental for virtue is  Kraut 
 1989 , while  Irwin  1985 ,  Cooper  1985 , and Nussbaum  1993 defend the claim that external goods are 
constitutive components of happiness. For a thoughtful treatment of this debate, see  Cashen  2012 
(esp. 4– 8). Both Cashen  2012 and  Heinaman  1993 (at 35) distinguish between (a) external goods that 
are instrumental for the exercise of virtue and (b) non- instrumental external goods. 
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 For it seems possible to have virtue while being asleep, or inactive through 
one’s whole life, and moreover, while suff ering the greatest evils and misfor-
tunes ( kakopathein kai atuchein ta megista ); and no one would call happy 
a person who was living this way, unless he were maintaining a thesis at all 
costs.  ( NE I 5 1095 b 32– 1096 a 2 ) 
 Similarly, in the discussion of pleasure in  NE VII 13, Aristotle declares 
that those who claim that moral goodness is the only requirement for 
happiness in all circumstances are talking nonsense, since “great misfor-
tunes” ( dustuchiais megalais ) necessarily have a negative impact on good 
people’s lives:
 Th ose who say that the victim on the rack or the person who falls into great 
misfortunes is happy if he is good, are, whether they mean to or not, talking 
nonsense.  ( NE VII 13 1153 b 19– 21 ) 
 Contrary to Socrates, who claims that  virtue is suffi  cient for happiness 
and that “a good person cannot be harmed” ( Apology 41d), 7  in these pas-
sages Aristotle calls into question this  suffi  ciency thesis and presents clear 
exceptions. In particular, virtue appears to be insuffi  cient for happiness in 
those cases in which the agent “suff ers the greatest evils and misfortunes” 
or “falls into great misfortunes.” Some evils are so excessive that they can 
signifi cantly aff ect anyone’s lives, including the lives of virtuous agents. 
 Indeed, although evils of fortune are sometimes instrumentally good 
and present opportunities for the exercise of virtue, they can also impede 
the good life. Just as goods of fortune are instrumentally good (in order 
to exercise virtue) and good in themselves (as potential constituents of a 
person’s happiness), so, too, evils of fortune are instrumentally bad (on 
account of providing obstacles to the exercise of virtue) and bad in them-
selves (on account of directly decreasing a person’s happiness). 
 In  NE I 8, for example, we fi nd the claim that some external goods (such 
as friends, wealth, and political power) are necessary instruments to reli-
ably do noble actions, and others (such as good birth, good children, and 
beauty) seem also to be direct contributors to our happiness:
 Yet evidently, as we said, [happiness] needs the external goods ( tôn ektos 
agathôn ) as well; for it is impossible, or not easy, to do noble actions 
without the proper equipment. In many actions we use friends and riches 
and political power as instruments; and there are some things the lack of 
which takes the lustre from blessedness, as good birth, satisfactory chil-
dren, beauty. For the person who is very ugly in appearance or ill- born 
 7   Other formulations of the suffi  ciency thesis in Plato are  Republic I, 353e10– 11 and  Gorgias 470e. For 
classic discussions of the suffi  ciency thesis in Plato, see  Vlastos  1985 and  Rudebush  1999 . 
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or solitary and childless is hardly happy. And perhaps someone would be 
still less so if he had thoroughly bad children or friends or had lost good 
children or friends by death. As we said, then, happiness seems to need 
this sort of prosperity in addition; for which reason some identify hap-
piness with good fortune, though others identify it with virtue.  ( NE I 8 
1099 a 31– b 8) 8  
 Evils of fortune can aff ect our lives indirectly, by hindering virtu-
ous activity and thereby either obstructing the exercise of an agent’s 
virtuous dispositions or impeding the acquisition of virtue; and also 
absolutely, by producing pain or loss, even destruction, in the lives of 
people in such a way that they are immediately worse off , indepen-
dently of questions about their character. 9  External evils like ugliness, 
lack of good birth, lack of friends, lack of children, bad children, bad 
friends, and loss of loved ones are particularly damaging and capable of 
tarnishing or even ruining happiness, including the happiness of agents 
with a good character. 
 Part of the reason why evils of fortune are intrinsically bad is that they 
cause pain and losses for the agent. Th is point is supported by the discus-
sions of pity and fear, two emotions that are directed at evils or apparent 
evils that are generally destructive or painful. 10  For example, in  Rhetoric II 
8 Aristotle off ers the following list of objects of pity:
 All unpleasant and painful things that are  destructive ( phthartika ) excite pity, 
and all that are  ruinous ( anairetika ); and all  evils of which fortune is the cause 
( hosôn hê tuchê aitia kakôn ). Th e painful and destructive evils are: death in 
its various forms ( thanatoi ), bodily injuries and affl  ictions, old age ( gêras ), 
diseases ( nosoi ), lack of food. Th e evils due to fortune are:  friendlessness 
( aphilia ), scarcity of friends (it is a pitiful thing to be torn away from 
friends and companions), ugliness ( aischos ), weakness ( astheneia ), mutila-
tion ( anapêria ); and evil coming from a source from which good ought to 
 8   Cf.  Rh. I 5 1360 b 19– 31 , where goods of fortune are included among the things that contribute to 
 eudaimonia as its “parts” ( merê ), and not just instrumentally. In this list the main “external goods” ( ta 
ektos agatha ) are “good birth, plenty of friends, good friends, wealth, good children, plenty of chil-
dren, a happy old age,” to which Aristotle adds “honor.” In addition, he off ers a list of “bodily goods” 
( ta en sômati ) as “health, beauty, strength, large stature, athletic powers,” the absence of which will 
make one’s life lacking. All these examples are considered here as things that are good in themselves 
and not as merely instrumentally good, while their absence is not only bad because it would impede 
virtuous action, but also because it can directly make life worse. 
 9   See Cashen  2012 for an interesting discussion of the potential bad eff ects of evils of fortune in the 
good life. His view, which I fi nd persuasive, is that these evils present two kinds of obstacles: on the 
one hand, external evils are instrumentally bad, since they obstruct the exercise of virtue; and on the 
other, external evils are bad in themselves insofar they produce pain and loss, which are two of the 
categories of bad. 
 10   See the defi nition of pity at  Rh. II 8 1385 b 13– 16 , and of fear at  Rh. II 5 1382 a 21– 22. 
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have come; and the frequent repetition of such misfortunes. Also the com-
ing of good after someone has suff ered [something bad].  ( Rh . II 8 1386 a 5– 15 ) 
 All the items mentioned in this list, which mostly overlaps with the list 
of evils of fortune from  NE I 8, are seen as deserving of pity because they 
are taken to be extremely painful or harmful to those who suff er them. 
Likewise, in  NE III 6 1115 a 10– 12 , we fi nd a list of fearful things that are evil 
absolutely ( haplôs ), including disgrace ( adoxian ), poverty ( penian ), disease 
( noson ), friendlessness ( aphilian ), and death ( thanaton ). Aristotle explains 
at  Rh. II 5 1382 a 24 that these things produce fear because they can produce 
“great pains or destructions.” 
 Th e  instrumental goodness or  badness of evils of fortune, and concretely, 
the positive or negative impact that they might have in a good person’s life 
by promoting or impeding virtuous activity, becomes most apparent in the 
discussions of mixed actions and extreme situations. Sometimes evils pre-
sent opportunities to exercise virtue, such as when agents are able to endure 
pains and losses while choosing the noble and avoiding the shameful. 
However, bad fortune often forces good people to choose actions that are in 
tension with what they would do if their fortune were more favorable (such 
as in the case of mixed actions), 11  and on other occasions the possibility of 
exercising virtue is truncated by evils like incapacitating sickness, imprison-
ment, or death. Th is is so because, for Aristotle, decisions are always relative 
to the situation. As a result,  we choose things that are not what we would 
choose in general but are nonetheless adequate responses under the circum-
stances on account of fear of greater evils ( dia phobon meizonôn kakôn ) or 
the desire to achieve something noble ( NE III 1 1110 a 4–5). “For example, if 
a tyrant were to order one to do something shameful, having one’s parents 
and children in his power, and if one did the action they were to be saved, 
but otherwise would be put to death” ( NE III 1 1110 a 5– 7 ). 
 In the examples of mixed actions, Aristotle repeatedly uses the verb “to 
endure” ( hupomenô ) to refer to the relation of good agents to the shame, 
loss, or pain that they might occasionally suff er under pressure. Although 
Aristotle insists that the agents are in these cases the ultimate source of 
movement, he places some distance between them and their painful or 
shameful actions by talking about “enduring”: “For such actions people 
are sometimes even praised, when they endure ( hupomenôsin ) something 
shameful or painful in return for great and noble objects gained” ( NE III 
1 1110 a 19– 22 ). It is acceptable, then, to endure a loss, something painful, 
  11   For a discussion of mixed actions that takes into consideration similar issues, see  Nielsen  2007 . 
Aristotle on Enduring Evils While Staying Happy 163
163
and even something shameful, if the goal is something noble that out-
weighs the loss, pain, or shame. However, it is not acceptable if there is no 
noble goal in sight: “in the opposite case they are blamed, since to endure 
( hupomeinai ) the greatest indignities for no noble end or for a trifl ing end 
is the mark of an inferior person” (1110 a 22– 23 ). 
 Concretely, there is a limit to how much shamefulness an agent can 
endure to avoid other evils. Th e example that Aristotle gives is Euripides ’ 
Alcmaeon, 12  who killed his mother to escape his father’s curse. In cases like 
this, Aristotle claims, “we cannot be forced to act, but we ought to face 
death rather than suff ering such terrible things” ( NE III 1 1110 a 26– 27 ). In 
some cases, death is preferable, even if it might seem to be more destruc-
tive, since it is better to die than to continue living and engage in horrible 
and shameful actions. Neither of these options, however, is conducive to 
happiness. 
 7.5  Th e Silver Lining of Manageable Misfortunes 
 Virtue, then, is, not suffi  cient for happiness. However, Aristotle does not 
fully reject the spirit of the suffi  ciency thesis. He admits that virtue not 
only enables agents to enjoy the goodness of good things, it also equips 
them to properly  endure evil when they encounter it. Virtuous people 
will have high stability in relation to fortune, since virtue enables them to 
endure misfortunes with nobility and elegance:
 Th e attribute in question [stability], then, will belong to the happy person 
( eudaimoni ), and he will be happy throughout his life; for always, or by 
preference to everything else, he will do and contemplate what is virtu-
ous, and he will endure ( oisei ) the turns of fortune ( tas tuchas ) most nobly 
( kallista ) and altogether gracefully ( emmelôs ), if he is “truly good” and “four- 
square beyond reproach.”  ( NE I 10 1100 b 18– 22 ) 
 Moreover, some external evils work well as tests of our character and, in the 
best of cases, allow virtue to shine:
 Now many events happen by chance and diff er in greatness and smallness; 
small pieces of good fortune ( ta men mikra tôn eutuchêmatôn ) or of its oppo-
site clearly do not weigh down the scales of life one way or the other, but a 
multitude of great events ( ta de megala kai polla ) if they turn out well will 
make life more blessed ( makariôteron ) (for not only are they themselves 
  12   Alcmaeon is a lost play of Euripides in which Alcmaeon killed his mother Eriphyle to escape the 
curse of his father Amphiaraos. Aristotle quotes Alcmaeon in  NE V 9 1136 a 13 : “I slew my mother; 
that is my tale in brief.” 
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such as to add beauty to life, but the way someone deals with them may be 
noble and good), while if they turn out ill they crush and maim blessedness 
( thlibei kai lumainetai to makarion ). For they both bring pain with them 
and hinder ( empodisei ) many activities. Yet even in these nobility shines 
through ( dialampei to kalon ), whenever someone endures ( pherêi ) with ease 
( eukolôs ) many great misfortunes ( atuchias ), not through insensibility to 
pain but through nobility and greatness of soul.  ( NE I 10 1100 b 22– 33 ) 
 When turns of fortune are handled properly, then, they will “make life 
more blessed.” Aristotle says that “nobility shines through” when the agent 
“endures” the evils with elegance and ease, and even in diffi  cult situations 
where the agent may not succeed at bringing about a good solution. 
 For this reason, Aristotle claims that we ought not to fear some of the so- 
called evils, which instead should be endured with dignity, insofar as they 
are not due to vice or to any failure of the agent’s character. For example, 
in  NE III 6, he suggests this point about poverty and sickness: “Poverty 
and sickness we perhaps ought not to fear, nor in general the things that do 
not proceed from vice and are not due to the person” ( NE III 6 1115 a 17– 18 ). 
Virtue gives us resources to deal with and be unafraid of these natural evils. 
And although the presence of poverty and sickness are often obstacles to the 
regular exercise of an agent’s virtue, they might lead the agent to fi nd new 
ways of doing things and maintain their virtue with less external resources. 
 One of the reasons why external misfortunes are manageable for virtu-
ous people and do not ruin their happiness is that, although happiness 
requires the presence of external goods, it does not require many things or 
great things:
 We must not think that a person will need many things or great things to 
be happy, merely because he cannot be blessed without external goods; for 
self- suffi  ciency and action do not lie in excess, and we can do noble acts 
without ruling earth and sea; for even with moderate advantages one can 
act in accordance with virtue (this is manifest enough; for private people are 
thought to do worthy acts no less than rulers – indeed even more). And it is 
enough that we should have so much as that; for the life of the person who 
is active in accordance with virtue will be happy.  ( NE X 9 1179 a 1– 9 ) 
 Although the presence of certain external goods and the absence of mis-
fortunes are necessary conditions for happiness, this requirement does not 
involve an excessive presence of external goods or an absolute absence of 
external evils. Here Aristotle agrees with Solon and Anaxagoras that hap-
piness requires only a moderate amount of external goods – and, we could 
add, happiness can tolerate a moderate amount of external evils – as the 
exercise of virtue does not require many material resources. It follows, 
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then, that even in scarcity the good person will be able to act virtuously 
and be happy. 
 One of the collateral advantages of ordinary, manageable misfortunes 
is that they off er a privileged perspective of our moral character by test-
ing how we behave in diffi  cult circumstances. Th ese tests are familiar, for 
example, in the context of friendship, where time and hardships reveal 
who are real friends and who are not:
 Time is said to show the friend, and also do misfortunes ( atuchiai ) rather 
than moments of good fortune. For then it is clear that the goods of friends 
are common (for friends alone instead of things naturally good and evil – 
which are the matters with which good and bad fortune are concerned – 
choose a person rather than the existence of some of those things and the 
non- existence of others). But misfortune ( atuchia ) shows those who are not 
really friends, but friends only for some utility.  ( EE VII 2 1138 a 14– 20 ) 
 True friends are not easy to distinguish from false friends, and misfor-
tunes off er a golden opportunity to test our friends. 13  Misfortunes present 
here for Aristotle, then, an epistemic advantage, since they allow us to test 
something like virtue or love, which is normally hidden and diffi  cult to 
confi rm. 
 Similarly, war, with all its horrors, off ers another good opportunity for 
knowledge of others, self- knowledge, and character formation, since the 
context of war is one in which we can see people’s true colors and even 
our own. As Aristotle reveals in the discussion of courage, it is precisely in 
the face of the greatest evils that people are called upon to show their true 
character. (Th is is not to encourage doing courageous actions regardless of 
the cost, or not fearing the evils of battle at all. In fact, it would be absurd 
not to fear some evils, given that they are terrifying for anyone who has 
use of reason.) 
 7.6  Priam’s Problem and the Puzzle of Noble Death 
 As shown in  Section 7.4 , Aristotle seems to think that certain evils of for-
tune have the power to tarnish happiness even in those who are “truly good 
and wise.” He uses Priam as paradigmatic example of the eff ects of large- 
scale misfortunes in the life of a decent person. His general view is that if 
the agents are good and “endure” ( pherein ) the evils of fortune “elegantly” 
  13   Aristotle raises this point also at  EE VII 1 1235 b 6– 9 : “Further, some think it easy to acquire a friend, 
others a very rare thing to recognize one, and impossible without misfortune ( aneu atuchias ); for all 
wish to seem friends to the prosperous.” 
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( euschêmonôs ), they will not become miserable. However, great and numer-
ous misfortunes, such as those experienced by Priam, unavoidably aff ect 
any agents’ happiness and their relationships with others in a way that will 
be diffi  cult to reverse, and they are a clear obstacle for a blessed life. Th e 
relevant passage merits quoting at length:
 If activities are, as we said, what determines [the character of ] life, no 
blessed person ( makariôn ) can become miserable ( athlios ); for he will 
never do the actions that are hateful and evil ( phaula ). For the person 
who is truly good and wise, we think, endures ( pherein ) all the chances 
of life elegantly ( euschêmonôs ) and always makes the best of circum-
stances, as a good general makes the best military use of the army at his 
command and a shoemaker makes the best shoes out of the hides that 
are given him; and so with all other craftsmen. And if this is the case, the 
happy person ( eudaimôn ) can never become miserable ( athlios ) – though 
he will not reach blessedness ( makarios ) , if he meet with fortunes like 
those of Priam. 
 Nor, again, is [the happy person] many- coloured and changeable; for 
neither will he be moved from his happy state easily or by any ordinary 
misfortunes, but only by many great ones ( megalôn kai pollôn ), nor, if he 
has had many great misadventures, will he recover his happiness in a short 
time, but if at all, only in a long and complete one in which he has attained 
many splendid successes.  ( NE I 10 1100 b 33– 1101 a 13 ) 
 Th is vulnerability of the virtuous person is due, I think, to the fact that 
the harmful or painful character of evils of fortune sometimes runs inde-
pendent from moral considerations. While it is often in the hands of 
virtuous agents to choose the noble as good and to avoid the shameful as 
bad, all while downplaying considerations about pleasure, gain, pain, and 
loss, sometimes people are forced to deal with situations involving pains 
and losses that have no direct connection to virtuous agency. One of the 
reasons why Priam is a good illustration of this point is that his misfor-
tunes occurred when he was already old and unable to actively respond to 
them. He could exercise his agency only insofar as he was actively endur-
ing his misfortunes; however, given his situation, he simply was on the 
receiving end of a chain of destructive events and could not do anything 
to stop it. 
 At  NE III 6 1115 a 35– b 6 , Aristotle uses a more mundane example that also 
illustrates well his point that sometimes people can suff er evils in situations 
that leave no room for virtuous action: the case of a courageous person dealing 
with a destructive storm at sea or with a mortal disease. Aristotle maintains 
that both illness and natural disasters are situations in which a courageous 
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person cannot exercise courage, as courage is shown “in situations where 
there is the opportunity of showing strength or where death is noble” but 
“cases of destruction” ( phthorais ) due to sickness or storm do not provide 
opportunities for virtue and nobility. Th ere is nothing noble for the virtu-
ous person to choose while enduring the pains and destructions of termi-
nal sickness or natural disaster; the virtuous person here simply suff ers the 
eff ects of events that are beyond his control. In these cases virtue or noble 
activity cannot counterbalance the pain or loss caused by misfortunes, and 
these will thereby unavoidably tarnish the suff erer’s blessedness. 
 Many great misfortunes, and particularly those that result in premature 
death or a big loss, typically involve a similar kind of helplessness of the 
agent, and can have as a consequence a negative eff ect on the happiness 
of virtuous people. Th ere is, however, one example of a clearly destruc-
tive phenomenon that is nonetheless not truly damaging for the virtuous 
person but instead an opportunity for the exercise of virtue: noble death 
in battle. 
 Although Aristotle does not explicitly classify death as an evil, he does 
include it with other evils on the list of “the frightening things” ( ta phobera ), 
and claims that death is “the most frightening of all” ( phoberôtaton ), since 
“nothing is thought to be any longer either good or bad for the dead” ( NE 
III 6 1115 a 26– 27 ). 14  In this regard, he claims at  NE III 7 (and again at  NE IX 
4 1166 a 10– 29 ), that death is most painful and destructive for good people, 
since their lives are most pleasant and valuable:
 And the more he is possessed of virtue in its entirety and the happier he is, 
the more he will be pained at the thought of death; for life is best worth 
living for such a person, and he is knowingly losing the greatest goods, and 
this is painful.  ( NE III 7 1117 b 9– 13 ) 
 Why, then, is this “noble death” ( ton kalon thanaton ) on the battlefi eld 
to be chosen, despite the fact that it is a terrible thing? For Aristotle, the 
greatest opportunity for displaying prowess, and thus the context in which 
death is noblest, is war. For the warrior “the danger [of death] is not only 
greatest but most noble” ( NE III 6 1115 a 30– 32 ). For this reason, this kind of 
death is not merely an evil that good people simply endure but is rather an 
extraordinary opportunity to exercise virtue:
  14   Here Aristotle uses the same premise as Epicurus in his famous argument against the fear of death 
( Letter to Menoeceus , 125), but his argument leads to the opposite conclusion. His broader view is 
what is often called a “deprivation account” of the badness of death, i.e., death is bad because it 
deprives us from life, which is something good. 
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 Death and wounds will be painful to the courageous person and against his 
will, but he will endure ( hupomenei ) them because it is noble to do so or 
because it is shameful not to do so.  ( NE III 7 1117 b 7– 9 ) 
 While Aristotle rejects suicide to avoid mere pains or losses, and while, in 
general, choosing death is not an acceptable response against the pressure 
of external evils like poverty, passions, or pains ( NE III 7 1116 a 10– 15 ), death 
is the right choice when the alternative is doing the kinds of shameful 
things that signifi cantly aff ect one’s character. 
 For example, Aristotle claims that citizen soldiers are superior to profes-
sional soldiers on the grounds that the former prefer dying over fl eeing 
because death is noble while fl eeing is shameful, whereas the latter prefer 
doing something shameful instead of risking their lives in battle:
 Professional soldiers turn cowards, however, when the danger puts too 
great a strain on them and they are inferior in numbers and equipment; 
for they are the fi rst to fl y, while citizen- forces die at their posts, as in 
fact happened at the temple of Hermes. For to the latter fl ight is shame-
ful and death is preferable ( hairetôteros ) to preserving their lives on those 
terms; in contrast, the former from the very beginning faced the danger 
on the assumption that they were stronger, and when they know the facts 
they fl ee, fearing death more than the shameful ( ton thanaton mallon tou 
aischrou phoboumenoi ); but the courageous person is not like that.  ( NE III 
8 1116 b 15– 23 ) 
 Since sacrifi cing one’s life for a noble goal is virtuous, this kind of action 
is always a contribution to the agent’s happiness, even when it results 
in premature death. Aristotle gives the most explicit explanation of this 
phenomenon in  NE IX 8 1169 a 18– 26 , where he characterizes the virtuous 
person as someone who “will throw away both wealth and honours and 
in general the goods that are objects of competition, gaining for him-
self the noble.” Moreover, the virtuous person chooses to die for others 
(including his friends and his country) because “he would prefer a short 
period of intense pleasure to a long one of mild enjoyment, a twelve-
month of noble life to many years of humdrum existence, and one great 
and noble action to many trivial ones.” In general, Aristotle concludes, 
those who die for others are making a radical choice to get the noble for 
themselves. 
 Good people, then, are sometimes able to transform even death, 
the most terrible of things, into an opportunity to exercise virtue and 
achieve nobility. In general, they can transform evils of fortune, even 
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great ones, into goods that contribute to their own happiness. Th is is 
because they properly grasp the hierarchy between the shameful, the 
harmful, and the painful, and they are able to choose correctly even in 
diffi  cult cases. Th is is why, given the complex relations of dependency 
between the diff erent kinds of evils, Aristotle’s verdict is that acquiring 
the virtues of character, i.e., stable dispositions to choose the noble and 
avoid the shameful on every occasion, is the best strategy to avoid let-
ting misfortunes ruin our lives. 
